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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
ALLEN NELSON, : Case No. 20090842-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a conviction for Distribute of or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (2007), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Randall Skanchy, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4- 103(2)0) (2008). See Addendum A 
(Sentence, Judgment, Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Nelson's motion for mistrial 
where the trial court provided the jury with an erroneous instruction stating Mr. Nelson 
had been previously convicted of a crime under the same code section. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Mahl 2005 UT App 494, <|} 10, 125 
P.3d 103 ("[A] trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial and its 
decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.") (citation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 65:4. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following provisions determinative of the issues on appeal are 
located in Addendum B: 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI (impartial jury); 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (due process). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 12, 2009, an Information was filed charging Mr. Nelson with one count 
of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony. R. 1-2. An amended Information was filed March 26, 2009, charging the offense 
as a first degree felony alleging Mr. Nelson had been previously convicted under the 
same statute of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. R. 15-16. 
A preliminary hearing was held binding the case over for trial. R. 19. 
A jury trial was held on July 10, 2009. R. 33-34; 65. Defense counsel made a 
motion for mistrial after a jury instruction was given to the jury stating Mr. Nelson had 
been convicted previously under the same code section. R. 33; 65:4-6. The trial court 
denied the motion, proposing instead a curative instruction. R. 48; 65:6,50; see also Jury 
Instr. No. 27A. Defense counsel renewed his motion for mistrial. R. 65:49. The trial 
court determined that a curative instruction would be sufficient to cure the error. R. 
65:50. The jury found Mr. Nelson guilty of the charged offense. R. 53; 65:70. On 
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September 14, 2009, Mr. Nelson was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than 
five years to life. R. 57. A timely notice of appeal was filed on October 8, 2009. R. 59. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A jury trial was held July 10, 2009, where the State presented the testimony of 
Detective Steven Bigelow with the Salt Lake City Police Department. R. 65. Bigelow 
testified as follows: On March 10, 2009, Bigelow was conducting an undercover 
narcotics operation in the area around Pioneer Park and the nearby homeless shelter. R. 
65:16, 19. Bigelow's role in the operation as an undercover narcotics detective was to 
attempt to purchase crack cocaine from dealers. R. 65:20. 
While driving the undercover vehicle, Bigelow saw Mr. Nelson standing next to a 
young male, on the sidewalk in front of a business named Club Sound at approximately 
575 West and 200 South. R. 65:21, 38-39; State's Ex. 4. The young male's name was 
Sued Tursiose Azrazola (Sued); he was from Honduras and appeared to be in his teens 
but no evidence was offered about his age.1 R. 65:21, 24, 40. Bigelow testified that 
presently "the highest population of drug dealers down there are the Hondurans.. . ." R. 
65:40. Bigelow explained that Hondurans are "usually the best to buy from, because . . . 
they're not usually homeless" and have "the resources available" to "get a little more 
product " R. 65:40. 
Bigelow testified that Mr. Nelson and Sued were standing within inches of each 
other. R. 65:23. Bigelow stated he made eye contact with Mr. Nelson and drove up and 
1
 The State informed the jury that Sued had been deported out of the country by ICE. R. 
65:10. 
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parked his car right next to where Mr. Nelson was standing. R. 65:21. Bigelow rolled 
down the passenger window and Mr. Nelson asked "What do you need?" R. 65:21, 33. 
Bigelow said "I need a 20." R. 65:21, 33. Bigelow testified that usually if you are "just 
looking for the crack cocaine, you can just say how much you want, usually CI need a 20,' 
T need a 40.' That's indicating you want $20 worth of the crack cocaine." R. 65:18, 21, 
42-43. 
Bigelow testified that Sued appeared nervous when Bigelow told Mr. Nelson he 
needed a 20 and didn't seem to know what to do. R. 65:21, 33. Bigelow testified that 
Sued looked at Mr. Nelson and at that point, Mr. Nelson "nudged" Sued towards 
Bigelow's vehicle. R. 65:21. Bigelow testified that Sued "didn't seem to want to make 
eye contact with" Bigelow and Sued did not say a word throughout the transaction. R. 
65:24. Sued opened the passenger door and got into the vehicle. R. 65:21. When 
Bigelow told him he needed a "20," it did not appear Sued understood what he was 
saying. R. 65:22. Bigelow wasn't sure whether Sued spoke English but Bigelow 
believed he didn't because Sued didn't communicate with him and it appeared to 
Bigelow that Mr. Nelson was "helping him out," by acting as a translator. R. 65:24, 31-
32. However, Bigelow did not mention in his police report that Sued was nervous, did 
not speak English or that he had any trouble communicating. R. 65:41-42. Bigelow 
testified that Mr. Nelson was translating not through words but though his body language 
by nudging Sued and saying, "'Give him the 20. Give him the 20.'" R. 65:22, 32. 
Bigelow was uncertain whether Mr. Nelson's statement to "'[g]ive him the 20'" was 
directed at Sued or Bigelow. R. 65:33. 
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Sued spat out a plastic twist containing crack cocaine and the detective completed 
the transaction in the vehicle. R. 65:22. Bigelow testified that Sued got out of his vehicle 
and again stood next to Mr. Nelson. R. 65:22. Bigelow drove away eastbound on 
Second South and the "takedown signal" was given. R. 65:22, 39. When Mr. Nelson 
was arrested, no drugs, drug paraphernalia or money was found on his person. R. 65:34. 
Although the $20 bill used in the drug transaction was recovered, the officer who 
searched Mr. Nelson and Sued could not remember which person they found the money 
on. R. 65:35, 36. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in denying Mr. Nelson's motion for a 
mistrial after a jury instruction was given to the jury stating Mr. Nelson had previously 
been convicted of a crime under the same statutory section. The inclusion of the jury 
instruction denied Mr. Nelson a fair trial by an impartial jury in violation of due process 
and the Sixth Amendment. The trial court's abuse of discretion in denying Mr. Nelson's 
motion for mistrial requires reversal where it was prejudicial in that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that Mr. Nelson would have received a more favorable result given the State's 
dearth of evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
FAILING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL AFTER INCLUDING A JURY 
INSTRUCTION REFERENCING DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION. 
A trial court properly exercises its discretion in granting a motion for mistrial 
"'where the circumstances are such as to reasonably indicate . . . that a fair trial cannot be 
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had' and that a mistrial is necessary in order to avoid injustice." State v. Wach, 2001 UT 
35, <|}45, 24 P.3d 948 (deference is given to the trial court's "advantaged position . . . to 
determine the impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings"). 
Mr. Nelson maintains that the trial court was plainly wrong in denying his motion for 
mistrial where the erroneous jury instruction given to the jury indicating Mr. Nelson had 
been previously convicted of a crime under the same code section denied him of a fair 
trial by an impartial jury in violation of due process and the Sixth Amendment. R. 39; 
65:4-6, 48-50; see State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^ 46, 27 P.3d 1133 (trial court's 
denial of a motion for mistrial is reversible where the determination "'is plainly wrong in 
that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have 
had a fair trial. . . . '"); U.S. Const. Amend VI, XIV. The trial court's denial of the motion 
for mistrial constitutes reversible error because it was sufficiently prejudicial in that there 
was '"a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result'" for Mr. Nelson due to the dearth of evidence presented to sustain a conviction. 
State v. Pritchett 2003 UT 24, [^10, 69 P.3d 1278 (quotations and citation omitted). 
In this case, the jury was given a copy of the jury instructions to follow along with 
while the trial court read them aloud to the jury. R. 65:3. Included in the jury 
instructions given and being read to the jury by the trial court was the statement that "the 
defendant having been previously convicted under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)." R. 
39; 65:4. The trial court began reading Instruction No. 5 regarding the charges Mr. 
Nelson was alleged to have committed stating : 
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Distribution or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, Section 58-
37-8(l)(a)(ii)? Utah code Annotated as follows: That on or about March 
10th, 2009 at 575 West 200 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, having ~ let's see - the defendant - let's just skip that, and you 
may cross that out. That has been stricken. If you have a pen, do so. 
R. 74:5. 
After asking the members of the jury to cross out the statement regarding the 
previous conviction by the defendant, the trial court reread the instruction and continued 
reading thirteen more jury instructions before concluding. R. 74:2-11. After the jury was 
excused, Mr. Nelson moved for a mistrial arguing that despite the trial court's ability to 
catch the erroneous statement before reading it aloud to the jury, the jurors were 
following along with their written copy of the instructions. R. 65:4. Mr. Nelson argued 
that the jury having read that he was previously convicted of a crime under the same code 
section was going to highly prejudice the jury, denying him of the right to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury in violation of due process. R. 65:4. The State agreed that an error 
occurred with the inclusion of the statement regarding Mr. Nelson's previous conviction 
into the jury instructions but believed the error could be "cured and rendered harmless by 
an explanatory instruction from the Court." R. 65:5. 
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial determining the error could be cured 
with an instruction. 
I've asked [the jury] as we went through that to strike it. . . . Really, that's 
an error that lies with the Court. I know that the language of the document, 
or at least of the offending sentence indicates "the defendant having been 
previously convicted," and gives no indication of what that previous 
conviction will be. The taint is lessened to some extent. I certainly would 
agree that as I asked them to do, they followed along as I am reading it. So 
I'm certain that they were following along, but I've asked them to strike it. 
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I'll provide a curative instruction that speaks about the fact that that's an 
error from the Court's—the Court's inclusion from stock instructions, and 
that that's not apart of the charge in this case, and that no evidence is being 
presented on any—anything akin to it. 
R. 65:6. 
The jury was brought back into the courtroom and the trial resumed. R. 65:7-48. 
After both sides had rested, the trial court excused the jury before going over the 
concluding jury instructions. R. 65:48. The trial court proposed Jury Instruction No. 
27A as a curative instruction. R. 48;65:48. Instruction 27A read: 
The Court previously instructed you to delete certain language in 
Instruction No. 5 which you have done. This court prepared Instruction 
No. 5 from a standard set of Instructions and inadvertently included the 
language you have been asked to delete from another Instruction. It is not a 
part of this charge, was inadvertently included in it, and no evidence has 
been presented in this case to support such a statement. Accordingly, you 
should disregard that language. 
R.48. 
Mr. Nelson renewed his motion for mistrial arguing the curative instruction was 
not adequate to cure the prejudicial error. R. 65:49. The State argued the instruction was 
adequate to cure the error. R. 65:50. However, it suggested that it might be wise for the 
court to replace the instruction that the jury has "so that they don't have it to read over 
and over again, because I believe they still have that instruction with that language in it." 
R. 65:50. In denying Mr. Nelson's renewed motion for mistrial the court stated: 
I told them to cross it out. I think I believe that I saw them doing such. If I 
were to ask for the instructions and to white them out, it draws the same 
attention to it. If I were to replace that instruction, I believe it draws more 
attention to it. This instruction indicates it was made by a mistake, 
included inadvertently and is not part of the charge, and has no evidence to 
support it and they should disregard it. I think that is sufficient. 
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R. 65:50. 
After the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the trial judge indicated that 
he hoped the jury had their written instructions as he was going to finish reading the 
remainder of instructions along with additional ones that have been supplemented. R. 
65:51;74:11-16. 
The trial court's failure to declare a mistrial after the jury was tainted by the 
erroneous statement that Mr. Nelson had previously been convicted of a crime under the 
same statutory section was an abuse of discretion. The court was incorrect in 
determining that there was no indication in that erroneous statement what the prior 
conviction was for and therefore the "taint" was less. R. 65:6. The statement was highly 
prejudicial and denied Mr. Nelson of the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury in 
violation of due process and the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI, XIV; 
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 , 560 (1967) (noting that because evidence of prior 
offenses "is generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice, it is usually excluded 
. . . ."); State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, ^12, 189 P.3d 69 ("acknowledge[ing] that 
'the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant prejudice.'") 
(citation omitted). Given that the State had very little evidence to support the offense 
charged against Mr. Nelson, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have 
returned a more favorable verdict about the error. 
Mr. Nelson was charged with one count of distribution of or arranging to distribute 
a controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (2007). Under 
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the statute the State must be able to show that "an offer, agreement, consent, or 
arrangement to distribute controlled substances was made by [Mr. Nelson] and , . . . that 
the behavior was 'engaged in knowingly or with intent that such distribution would, or 
would be likely to, occur.'" State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, %9, 3 P.3d 725 (citing 
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979)). "To be guilty of arranging" it was 
necessary for Mr. Nelson to have "committed some 'act in furtherance of an 
arrangement5 to distribute controlled substances." IdL at f^lO (citation omitted). "Intent to 
commit a crime can be 'inferred from the actions of the defendant or from surrounding 
circumstances.'" Id. at <p 1. 
To support its allegation that Mr. Nelson intended to arrange the distribution of a 
controlled substance, the State presented the testimony of the undercover detective 
Steven Bigelow. R. 65:15-44; 46-47. The State admitted to the jury during its opening 
statement that the only people who knew what happened that day were the detective, 
Sued, and Mr. Nelson. R. 65:10. And because Sued had been deported out of the 
country by ICE, the State's case rested entirely on the detective's testimony. R. 65:10. 
Detective Bigelow testified that he was attempting to purchase crack cocaine as part of 
his undercover narcotics operation in the area around Pioneer Park. R. 65: 20. While 
driving his vehicle, Bigelow saw Sued and Mr. Nelson standing close together on a 
sidewalk in front of a business. R. 65:21, 38-39. 
Bigelow testified that he made eye contact with Mr. Nelson as he pulled his car up 
next to where Sued and Mr. Nelson were standing. R. 65:21. Bigelow rolled down the 
passenger window and Mr. Nelson asked "What do you need?" R. 65:21, 33. Bigelow 
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responded that he needed "a 20." R. 65:21,33. Although never mentioned in Bigelow's 
report, he testified that Sued appeared nervous and did not know what to do. R. 65:18, 
33. Bigelow testified that Sued looked at Mr. Nelson and Mr. Nelson "nudged" Sued 
towards Bigelow's vehicle. R. 65:21. Sued got into the vehicle with Bigelow and 
Bigelow told him he needed a "20." R. 65:22. Bigelow could hear Mr. Nelson yelling 
"Give him the 20. Give him the 20." R. 65:22. However, Bigelow did not know if Mr. 
Nelson's comment was directed at him or Sued. R. 65:33. 
Bigelow testified that Sued did not speak throughout the transaction and it 
appeared that Sued did not understand what Bigelow was saying. R. 65:22, 24. Bigelow 
was unsure whether Sued spoke English but believed that he didn't and testified that it 
appeared Mr. Nelson was acting as his translator. R. 65:24, 31-32. Bigelow testified that 
Mr. Nelson was not translating verbally but through his body language by nudging Sued 
and saying "Give him the 20. Give him the 20." R. 65:21-22, 32. Bigelow did not 
include in his police report that Sued was nervous, did not speak English or that he had 
any trouble communicating. R. 65:41-42. At this point, Sued spat out a plastic twist of 
crack cocaine and Bigelow and Sued made the exchange. R. 65:22. Sued got back out of 
the vehicle and stood next to Mr. Nelson again. R. 65:22. After Bigelow gave the 
"takedown signal," both Mr. Nelson and Sued were arrested. R. 65:22, 39. No drugs, 
drug paraphernalia or money was found on Mr. Nelson's person. R. 65:34. 
When viewing the State's scant evidence from their only witness, it is easy to 
conclude that, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have 
returned with a verdict more favorable to Mr. Nelson on the arranging to distribute 
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charge. The whole of the State's evidence left a question as to whether Mr. Nelson was 
actually part of the transaction or otherwise had the intent to arrange the distribution of a 
controlled substance. The dearth of evidence supports that the improper statement 
included in the jury instruction affected the substantial rights of Mr. Nelson. Due to the 
prejudicial effect of that statement, a curative instruction was not sufficient to obviate the 
problem. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998) ("Some errors may be too 
prejudicial for curative instructions to mitigate their effect, and a new trial may be the 
only proper remedy.")- The jurors read that Mr. Nelson had been previously convicted 
under the same statutory section that he was again being accused of violating. Although 
the judge asked the jurors to cross out the language, it is unclear whether they did or were 
able to do so. As the State pointed out, without removing the offending jury instructions, 
the juror's were able to take it back with them in deliberations and read it over and over 
again. 
Under the facts of this case, it cannot be said that Mr. Nelson received a fair trial 
and "a mistrial [was] necessary in order to avoid injustice." Wach, 2001 UT 35 at [^45. 
Therefore, the trial court's denial of Mr. Nelson's motion for mistrial is reversible error 
where the determination was plainly wrong in "that the incident so likely influenced the 
jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial" by an impartial jury. 
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59 at Tf46. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial and remand for a new trial. 
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SUBMITTED this ^ day of May, 2010. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 8, 1950 
Video 
Tape Number: 9:59 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC 
(amended) - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/10/2009 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE 
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC a 1st Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than 
five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
NELSON JACKSON 
Case No: 091901996 
Date: Sep 14, 2009 
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DEPUTY COUBtJ 
L i h B 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
